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PRIORITIZING NATIONAL SECURITY AT 
THE EXPENSE OF REFUGEE RIGHTS: THE 
EFFECTS OF H.T. v. LAND BADEN-
WÜRTTENBERG 
THOMAS F. LAMPERT* 
Abstract: Tensions are high in member states of the European Union as they 
struggle to accommodate a record number of refugees while simultaneously con-
fronting seemingly regular terrorist attacks.  In response to this crisis, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice’s decision in H.T. v. Land Baden-Württenberg continued a 
trend that began after September 11, 2001, in which countries implement policies 
that diminish and threaten the rights of refugees.  Specifically, the European 
Court of Justice ruled that legislation governing the distribution of residence 
permits to refugees impliedly allowed for the revocation of a residence permit 
from a refugee accused of terrorist activities.  This decision weakens internation-
al custom prohibiting the expulsion of refugees to places where they may be in 
danger.  While the court implemented safeguards, including a requirement that 
the refugee engage in more than cursory support for terrorist organizations, the 
decision is still another step in an alarming trend that places refugees at risk. 
INTRODUCTION 
Global forced displacement surpassed sixty million people in 2015 and a 
record 1.3 million migrants applied for asylum in European Union (EU) coun-
tries throughout the year.1 Many of these asylum seekers qualify as refugees 
who are entitled to special protections under international law, including pro-
tection from refoulement—the expulsion to a state where they may be in dan-
ger.2 This unprecedented increase in asylum seekers comes amidst a process 
                                                                                                                           
 * Thomas Lampert is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Aug. 2, 2016), http://pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-
record-1-3-million-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/YH6Y-TX3Y]; Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel 
Krogstad, Key Facts About the World’s Refugees, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/key-facts-about-the-worlds-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/43ZD-
J4P2]. 
 2 See Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137, 176 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]; Alexandra Popescu, The EU “Costs” of the Refugee Cri-
sis, 10 EUROPOLITY CONTINUITY & CHANGE EUR. GOVERNANCE 105, 110 (2016); Laurence Peter, 
Migrant Crisis: Who Does the EU Send Back?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-34190359 [https://perma.cc/T2ZZ-WR2G]. 
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that began after September 11, 2001 (9/11), in which countries have imposed 
anti-terrorism policies that diminish and threaten the rights of refugees.3 Since 
that time, and increasingly during the current refugee crisis, the competing in-
terests of protecting refugees’ rights and meeting the demands of fearful citi-
zens have led to high tension in EU member states.4 
In June 2015, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in H.T. v. Land 
Baden-Württemberg that a nation may revoke a refugee’s residence permit, 
even though refugees are afforded protection and benefits.5  The court also 
ruled that revocation requires a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the 
refugee supports a terrorist group.6 By trying to balance the competing inter-
ests of safety and protecting refugee rights, the court in H.T. took another step 
toward weakening refugee rights in the name of prioritizing national security.7 
Part I of this comment provides the factual background and procedural 
history of H.T. v. Land Baden-Württemberg. Part II discusses the holding and 
legal context of the case. Part III highlights the significance of the case in the 
context of the greater refugee crisis and the continuing trend toward less secure 
rights for refugees. Part III also argues that while the court established safe-
guards to protect refugees, this decision is a further blow to their rights.   
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Mr. T’s Refugee Status and Indefinite Residence Permit 
Mr. T, the plaintiff in H.T. v. Land Baden-Württemberg, is a Turkish na-
tional born in 1956.8 He moved to Germany in 1989 and resided in the country 
with his wife and eight children, five of whom are German nationals, until the 
time of this case.9 During the 1990s, Mr. T. engaged in political activities in 
support of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Kurdish group that has been 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures That 
Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 13 (2008) (“Since September 11, 2001, nation-
al security has become an increasingly important issue for host states, many of whom have promul-
gated counter-terror policies that negatively impact protection offered to refugees and asylum-
seekers.”); Connor, supra note 1. 
 4 See Popescu, supra note 2, at 106, 110; Jeanne Park, Europe’s Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/refugees-and-the-displaced/europes-migration-
crisis/p32874 [https://perma.cc/5FQJ-7Q3D]; Richard Wike et al., Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees 
Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/
2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/ [https://perma.
cc/RHV2-J6BJ]. 
 5 See Case C-373/13, H.T. v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 2015 E.C.R. 413, ¶¶ 95, 99. 
 6 See id. ¶¶ 84, 95, 99. 
 7 See id. ¶¶ 39, 52; Farmer, supra note 3, at 13; Park, supra note 4 (“[T]he European Union’s 
collective response to its current migrant influx has been ad hoc and, critics charge, more focused on 
securing the bloc’s borders than on protecting the rights of migrants and refugees.”). 
 8 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 27. 
 9 Id. 
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engaged in an armed conflict with the Turkish Government since the 1970s.10 
Due to the threat of political persecution in the event that he returned to Tur-
key, on June 24, 1993 Mr. T. gained refugee status as defined under the Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention).11 In ad-
dition to his refugee status, Mr. T. received an indefinite residence permit in 
Germany on October 7, 1993.12 
On August 21, 2006, Mr. T. lost his refugee status when German authori-
ties determined he was no longer under threat because of changed political cir-
cumstances in Turkey.13 Mr. T. appealed the revocation of his refugee status to 
the Verwaltungsgericht Karlsruhe (Administrative Court of Karlsruhe), which 
overruled that decision and reinstated Mr. T’s refugee status on November 30, 
2007.14 Mr. T. remained a refugee within the meaning of the Geneva Conven-
tion until the time of the decision in H.T. v. Land Baden-Württemberg on June 
24, 2015.15 
B. Mr. T’s Terrorist Activity and Criminal Sanction 
On November 22, 1993, the Federal Ministry of the interior prohibited 
engagement in activities on behalf of the PKK and organizations connected to 
the PKK under the Vereinsgesetz (Associations Act).16 Thereafter, a search of 
Mr. T’s home produced documents revealing that he collected donations and 
disseminated a PKK publication on behalf of the group.17 As a result, German 
authorities charged Mr. T. under the Associations Act and the Landgericht 
Karlsruhe (Regional Court of Karlsruhe) ordered Mr. T. to pay €3000 for his 
illegal association and activity.18 Mr. T. unsuccessfully appealed that decision 
to the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), and the Regional Court of 
Karlsruhe’s decision became final on April 8, 2009.19 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Id. ¶ 32; Profile: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), BBC NEWS (July 27, 2015), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100 [https://perma.cc/DDB3-E68B]. 
 11 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 28; see Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. 
 12 Id. ¶ 29. 
 13 Id. ¶ 30. Though the court did not delineate the specific political changes, the timing coincides 
with the PKK’s declaration of a ceasefire in a campaign against the Turkish military. See Turkey Pro-
file—Timeline, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17994865 
[https://perma.cc/U3KF-7YUG]. 
 14 Id. ¶ 31. 
 15 Id. ¶ 37. 
 16 Id. ¶ 33. 
 17 Id. ¶ 34. 
 18 Id. ¶ 35. 
 19 Id. 
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C. The Expulsion Decision 
On March 27, 2012, the Regierrungspräsidium Karlsruhe (Karlsruhe Re-
gional Government) ordered Mr. T. expelled from Germany based on actions 
he took in support of the PKK.20 The Karlsruhe Regional Government deter-
mined Mr. T. qualified as a “present danger” within the meaning of section 54 
of the Aufenthaltsgesetz (Residence Act).21  Accordingly, they called for his 
expulsion from the country and automatic invalidation of his residence permit 
pursuant to sections 51 and 54 of the Residence Act.22 
German authorities understood the expulsion decision to be a discretion-
ary administrative decision under section 56 of the Residence Act.23  The Act 
provides special protection from expulsion to, among others, foreign nationals 
who have refugee status or who live with German family members as a family 
unit.24 The authorities suspended Mr. T’s expulsion while he appealed the deci-
sion to the Administrative Court of Karlsruhe.25 The court denied the appeal, 
and Mr. T. appealed the denial to the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-
Württemberg (High Administrative Court).26 The High Administrative Court 
accepted the appeal on November 28, 2012.27 It then stayed the proceeding and 
requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice.28 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. ¶ 36. 
 21 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 36; see Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I], §§ 51, 54 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aufenthg_
2004/BJNR195010004.html [https://perma.cc/9PYG-H6MS].  Section 51 of the Residence Act pro-
vides “the residence permit is invalidated . . . upon expulsion of the foreign national.” Aufen-
thaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 51 (Ger.). Additionally, Section 
54 of the Residence Act states: 
A foreigner will generally be expelled if . . . there is reason to believe that he or she be-
longs to or has belonged to an organisation which supports terrorism or supports or has 
supported such an organisation; membership or supportive acts in the past may justify 
expulsion only if they constitute a current threat. 
Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 54 (Ger.). 
 22 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 36; see Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, 
BGBL I, §§ 51, 54 (Ger.).  
 23 See H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 22, 37.   
 24 See Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 56 (Ger.); H.T., 
2015 E.C.R. ¶ 37. 
 25 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 37. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. ¶ 38. 
 28 Id. ¶ 39. When national courts in European Union (EU) countries face complex questions of 
EU law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has jurisdiction to issue preliminary rulings on the inter-
pretation of that law. Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals in Relation to the Initiation 
of Preliminary Ruling Proceedings, 2012 O.J. (C 338) 1. This procedure aims to ensure “uniform 
interpretation and application of that law within the European Union.” Recommendations to National 
Courts and Tribunals in Relation to the Initiation of Preliminary Ruling Proceedings, supra. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Legal Context and Questions Referred to the ECJ 
The original expulsion decision, revocation of Mr. T’s permit, and the 
German authorities’ decision to suspend the expulsion have their foundation in 
German law.29 Under section 54 of the Residence Act, a foreign national may 
be expelled if they support a terrorist group and constitute a “present danger.”30 
Expulsion on these grounds further results in the invalidation of a residence 
permit, including the type issued to Mr. T.31 As a safeguard, however, the law 
affords special protections against expulsion of foreign nationals when certain 
conditions are met, which Mr. T. did.32 Hence, the expulsion decision, revoca-
tion of Mr. T’s residence permit, and the decision to suspend his expulsion 
were justified under German law so long as he was properly deemed a “present 
danger.”33  
German law provides for the expulsion of foreign nationals like Mr. T. 
notwithstanding their refugee status.34 International and EU law, on the other 
hand, provide binding protections for refugees that conflict with these German 
laws.35 For example, Article 21 governs the protection of refugees from “re-
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Case C-373/13, H.T. v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 2015 E.C.R. 413, ¶¶ 36–37. 
 30 Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 54 (Ger.); H.T., 2015 
E.C.R. ¶¶ 19, 36. 
 31 See Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 51 (Ger.); H.T., 
2015 E.C.R.  ¶¶ 18, 36. Section 51 of the Residence Act provides that “[t]he residence title shall ex-
pire . . . upon expulsion of the foreigner.” Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 
2008, BGBL I, § 51 (Ger.). 
 32 See Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 56 (Ger.); H.T., 
2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 22, 37. Section 56 of the Residence Act provides, in relevant part, that: 
A foreigner who . . . possesses a residence permit, has lawfully resided in the federal 
territory for at least five years and cohabits with a foreigner . . . cohabits with a German 
dependent or domestic partner in a family unit . . . is recognised as a person entitled to 
asylum, enjoys the legal status of a refugee . . . shall enjoy special protection from ex-
pulsion. He or she shall only be expelled on serious grounds pertaining to public securi-
ty and law and order. 
Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 56 (Ger.). 
 33 See Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, §§ 51, 54, 56 
(Ger.); see H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 36. 
 34 See Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 54 (Ger.)   
 35 Compare id. (stating a foreigner “will generally be expelled”), with Geneva Convention, supra 
note 2, arts. 32, 33, Council Directive 2004/83, arts. 21, 24, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 13 (EC) [hereinafter 
Council Directive], and H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 4, 5, 12, 22. Article 32 of the Geneva Convention pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territo-
ry save on grounds of national security or public order.” Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 32. 
Article 33 of the Geneva Convention provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o Contracting State shall 
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened.” Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 33. Article 21 of the 
Council Directive provides, in relevant part, that “member states shall respect the principle of non-
refoulement in accordance with their international obligations.” Council Directive, supra, art. 21. 
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foulement.”36 It provides that member states shall respect the Geneva Conven-
tion’s general prohibition against refoulement, but also outlines exceptions to 
that general rule.37 The exceptions, which mirror international law under the 
Geneva Convention, are laid out in paragraph two of the article.38 Under para-
graph two, a member state may refoule a refugee when there are reasonable 
grounds for considering them a danger to the member state’s security, or when 
the refugee has been convicted of a particularly serious crime such that they 
constitute a danger to the community of the member state.39 When a refugee 
qualifies for one of these exceptions, member states can remove, terminate or 
deny a refugee a residence permit.40 
While Article 21 protects refugees from refoulement, Article 24 governs 
the issuance of residence permits to refugees.41 The permits must be valid for 
at least three years and are renewable unless compelling reasons of national 
security or public order require otherwise.42 As a result, a decision under Arti-
cle 24 only affects the individual’s residence permit. 43 It does not explicitly 
provide for a permit’s revocation, does not affect refugee status, and thus does 
not affect the rights and benefits afforded to a refugee.44 Nonetheless, while it 
may not lead to expulsion back to the refugee’s country of origin, the revoca-
tion of a residence permit is still a step toward expulsion of the refugee.45  This 
                                                                                                                           
Article 24 of the Council Directive provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]s soon as possible after their 
status has been granted, Member States shall issue to beneficiaries of refugee status a residence permit 
which must be valid for at least three years and renewable unless compelling reasons of national secu-
rity or public order otherwise require.” Council Directive, supra, art. 24. 
 36 Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 21. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 33; Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 21. Article 
21(2) of the Council Directive provides:  
Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 1, Mem-
ber States may refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when: (a) there 
are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to the security of the 
Member State in which he or she is present; or (b) he or she, having been convicted by 
a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community 
of that Member State. 
Council Directive, supra, art. 21. 
 39 Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 21. 
 40 Id. Article 21(3) provides “Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant the 
residence permit of (or to) a refugee to whom paragraph 2 applies.” Id. 
 41 Id. arts. 21, 24. Article 24 provides, in relevant part “[a]s soon as possible after their status has 
been granted, Member States shall issue to beneficiaries of refugee status a residence permit which 
must be valid for at least three years and renewable unless compelling reasons of national security or 
public order otherwise require.” Id. art. 24. 
 42 Id. art. 24. 
 43 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73; Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 24. 
 44 See H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73.; Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 24. 
 45 See Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 56 (Ger.); H.T., 
2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 72–73. 
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is true in Germany in particular because possession of a residence permit is 
one of the special protections from expulsion under German law.46 
At the time of the decision, Mr. T. maintained his refugee status and en-
joyed the protections of Article 21.47 Additionally, he held a residence permit 
valid for an indefinite period of time and Article 24 did not explicitly provide 
for revocation of a residence permit.48 To determine whether Articles 21(2), 
21(3), and 24 of Directive 2004/83 justified the revocation of the residence 
permit and the expulsion decision, the Higher Administrative Court referred 
three questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.49 
The initial two-part question posed by the Higher Administrative Court 
first asked whether the rule in Article 24(1) must be observed in the case of 
revocation of a previously issued residence permit.50 Second, it asked whether 
that rule must be interpreted as precluding the revocation or termination of the 
residence permit of a refugee when the exceptions in Article 21(2) are not met, 
and there are no compelling reasons of national security or public order within 
the meaning of Article 24(1).51  
In its second question, the Higher Administrative Court asked “if parts (a) 
and (b) of the first question are answered affirmative[ly],” how must “compel-
ling reasons of national security or public order” be interpreted in relation to 
the risks represented by support for a terrorist organization.52  Moreover, it 
asked, “if parts (a) and (b) of the first question are answered affirmative[ly],” 
was it possible for “compelling reasons of national security or public order” to 
exist in the fact scenario presented, even if the conditions in Article 33 of the 
Geneva Convention and Article 21(2) were not fulfilled.53 Finally, in its third 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 56 (Ger.); H.T., 
2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 72–73.  Section 56 of the Residence Act provides “special protection from expulsion” 
for a foreign national who holds “a settlement permit and has lawfully resided [in Germany] for at 
least five years.” Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], Feb. 25, 2008, BGBL I, § 56 (Ger.).  
 47 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 37; see Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 21. 
 48 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 29; see Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 24. 
 49 H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 29, 38, 39, 40; see Council Directive, supra note 35, art. 24. 
 50 See H.T., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 39 (“Must the rule contained in the first subparagraph of Article 24(1) 
of Directive 2004/83, concerning the obligation of Member States to issue a residence permit to per-
sons who have been granted refugee status, be observed even in the case of revocation of a previously 
issued residence permit?”). 
 51 See id. (“Must that rule therefore be interpreted as precluding the revocation or termination of 
the residence permit (by expulsion under national law, for example) of a beneficiary of refugee status 
in cases where the conditions laid down in Article 21(3) in conjunction with (2) of Directive 2004/83 
are not fulfilled and there are no ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’ within the 
meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/83.”). 
 52 See id. (“If parts (a) and (b) of the first question are answered in the affirmative: (a) How must 
the ground for exclusion of ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’ in the first sub-
paragraph of Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/83 be interpreted in relation to the risks represented by 
support for a terrorist association?”). 
 53 See id. (“Is it possible for ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’ within the 
meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/83 to exist in the case where a 
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question, the court asked if rule 24(1) must be adhered to in the case of revoca-
tion of a previously issued residence permit, whether the revocation or termi-
nation of a residence permit issued to a refugee is permissible only in cases 
where the conditions laid down in Article 21(2) and (3) are satisfied.54  
B. Revocability of a Residence Permit Under Articles 21 and 24 
In response to questions one and three, the court determined that a member 
state can revoke a residence permit under both Article 21 and Article 24 so long 
as certain conditions are met.55 The court reasoned that a state may not revoke 
the residence permit of a refugee under Article 21(3) if they do not qualify for 
refoulement under Article 21(2).56 The question, therefore, was whether a refu-
gee that does not meet the criteria for refoulement under Article 21 could have 
their residence permit revoked under Article 24.57 While Article 24 does not ex-
plicitly allow for the revocation of a refugee’s residence permit, the court held 
that the ability of a member state to revoke it is inferred, so long as there are 
compelling reasons of national security or public order within the meaning of 
that provision.58 As a result, German officials can revoke a residence permit un-
der Article 21 and Article 24.59  
C. Mr. T’s Actions and the National Security and Public Order Conditions 
In response to the second question, the court held that support provided 
by a refugee to a terrorist organization, including the PKK, can meet the na-
tional security and public order conditions of Article 24(1).60 Nevertheless, the 
court found that a state must, on a case-by-case basis, determine whether the 
acts of the organization and the individual in question endanger national secu-
rity or public order.61 Moreover, the court found that just because an organiza-
tion’s acts fall within the conditions of Article 24(1), “the mere fact that the 
                                                                                                                           
beneficiary of refugee status has supported the PKK, in particular by collecting donations and regular-
ly participating in PKK-related events, even if the conditions for non-compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement laid down in Article 33(2) of the [Geneva Convention] and also, therefore, the condi-
tions laid down in Article 21(2) of Directive 2004/83 are not fulfilled?”). 
 54 Id. (“If part (a) of the first question is answered in the negative: Is the revocation or termination 
of the residence permit issued to a beneficiary of refugee status (by expulsion under national law, for 
example) permissible under EU law only in cases where the conditions laid down in Article 21(3) in 
conjunction with (2) of the Directive 2004/83 . . . are satisfied?”). 
 55 Id. ¶ 55. 
 56 Id. ¶ 44. 
 57 Id. ¶¶ 44–45. 
 58 Id. ¶¶ 47–52. 
 59 Id. ¶ 55. 
 60 See id. ¶¶ 80–82. 
 61 See id. ¶¶ 84, 86. 
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refugee supported that organisation cannot automatically mean that that per-
son’s residence permit is revoked pursuant to that provision.”62 
The ECJ laid out various factors for the High Administrative Court to 
consider in determining whether Mr. T.’s actions warranted expulsion.63 First, 
the court highlighted three considerations for national courts to use in deter-
mining whether a refugee’s actions meet the national security or public order 
exception of Article of 24(1): (1) whether the person in question actually 
committed terrorist acts, (2) whether and to what extent they were involved in 
planning, decision-making, or directing others planning or executing acts of 
that nature, and (3) whether and to what extent they financed such acts or pro-
vided the means to commit them to others.64 The court then highlighted con-
textual factors for this particular case, including “the degree of seriousness of 
danger to national security or public order of the acts committed by Mr. T.;” 
whether he may be charged personally for any of the PKK’s actions; whether 
the threat to national security or public order that may have been previously 
posed by Mr. T. still existed at the date of the decision; whether the fact that he 
was ordered to pay a fine and not imprisoned for his previous acts should carry 
weight; and whether, in light of that fact, there were compelling reasons of na-
tional security or public order to revoke his permit.65 
In sum, the court determined that supporting a terrorist organization, in-
cluding the PKK, could qualify as a compelling reason of national security or 
public order under Article 24(1).66 In order to act on that finding, the member 
state must conduct a case-by-case analysis of both the individual and the or-
ganization in question to determine whether or not revocation of a residence 
permit is justified.67 Importantly, the court also found that so long as an indi-
vidual maintains their refugee status, the revocation of the residence permit 
does not reduce the rights and benefits granted to those protected by their refu-
gee status.68 Those benefits include “protection from refoulement, maintenance 
of family unity, the right to travel documents, access to employment, educa-
tion, social welfare, healthcare and accommodation, freedom of movement 
within the Member State and access to integration facilities.”69 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. ¶ 87. 
 63 Id. ¶¶ 90–93. 
 64 See id. ¶ 90. 
 65 Id. ¶¶ 92–93. 
 66 See id. ¶¶ 81, 99. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. ¶¶ 73, 96. 
 69 Id. ¶ 95. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In H.T., the ECJ held that even if a refugee does not meet the require-
ments for refoulement under Article 21, Article 24 impliedly allows for the 
revocation of that refugee’s residence permit.70 In order to take such action, the 
member state must determine that the terrorist organization, and the refugee’s 
actions in particular, amount to “compelling reasons of national security or 
public order” within the meaning of Article 24.71 In addition, the court held 
that so long as an individual maintains their refugee status, they are still enti-
tled to the basic rights and benefits enjoyed by those with refugee status.72 
In the post 9/11 era, EU member states have consistently prioritized pro-
tection of the homeland over the protection of refugees’ rights.73 In doing so, 
the EU has developed what some consider to be exclusionist policies and 
tighter restrictions toward individuals seeking refugee status.74 This trend has 
arguably been exacerbated by the recent influx of refugees fueled by crises in 
the Middle East and Africa.75 Rightly or wrongly, many citizens in Europe tie 
this current influx of refugees to the constant threat of terrorism in their na-
tions.76 This association forces EU member states to balance two competing 
interests: answering the call to protect the homeland while simultaneously ad-
hering to international custom that requires the protection of refugee rights.77 
Thus far, the EU’s efforts to strike this balance are inconsistent and reject a 
common strategy.78 This has led to criticism of their inability to effectively 
address the phenomenon.79 
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H.T. has a direct impact on one of the many potential issues related to the 
migration crisis.80 Specifically, the case addresses when and why a refugee 
may have their residence permit revoked.81 Though Mr. T. already had refugee 
status, this was the first time the court determined courses of action available 
to a member state when an individual protected by refugee status takes action 
supporting a terrorist group.82 As such, the ECJ faced the difficult task of 
reaching a decision that sufficiently protected Germany, while simultaneously 
upholding Mr. T.’s rights as a refugee.83 This forced the court to consider inter-
national, EU, and German law.84 
With their decision to allow revocation of a residence permit under Arti-
cle 24, the ECJ may have weakened what some consider jus cogens: the prohi-
bition against the refoulement of refugees.85 If they did, the balancing test and 
requirement that member states still provide benefits to refugees who have had 
their permit revoked may safeguard refugees against abuse in a charged politi-
cal climate.86 Despite those potential safeguards, the question remains whether 
the ECJ opened the door for the continued weakening of refugee rights and 
protections that diminish a refugee’s fear of expulsion.87 
A. Weakening the International Prohibition of the Refoulement of Refugees 
The court in H.T. went to great lengths to distinguish refoulement of a 
refugee from the revocation of a refugee’s residence permit.88 The policy of 
non-refoulement of refugees is grounded in the belief that human beings 
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should not be returned to countries where their dignity and safety is at risk.89 
Given this powerful foundation, the decision to refoule a refugee is to be made 
only in the most extreme circumstances, and the international standards for 
doing so set a high bar for refoulement. 90 
The ECJ highlighted this high bar in H.T. and contrasted refoulement with 
the decision to revoke a residence permit.91 The main difference, the court de-
termined, was the potentially dire consequence of refoulement of a refugee in 
contrast to the seemingly less grave decision to revoke their residence permit.92 
Accordingly, the court stated that the exceptions to the non-refoulement rule 
should be read more strictly than the requirements for the revocation of a resi-
dence permit.93 
EU member states enjoy discretion in determining how to treat refugees 
within their borders.94 In the current climate, EU member states go to great 
lengths to fit refugees into the delineated exceptions to non-refoulement.95 
That being said, given that the referring court only asked whether Mr .T.’s ac-
tions fit within the exceptions to Article 24, it follows that the ECJ may have 
thought Mr. T.’s actions in support of the PKK did not meet the high bar set for 
refoulement under Article 21.96 Nevertheless, the court questioned whether 
they could take steps to expel Mr. T. because of his actions in support of the 
PKK.97 Where EU member states prioritize the protection of their borders and 
homeland over the rights of refugees, it is logical that member states want the 
ability to take action when they perceive a potential terrorist threat.98 The 
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ECJ’s decision to allow revocation of a residence permit under Article 24 may 
provide them with that opportunity.99 
The holding that member states can revoke the residence permit of a refu-
gee seemingly creates a new option through which member states can take 
steps toward expelling refugees.100 It is true that expulsion and refoulement are 
two different things, as one returns the refugee to where they may be in danger, 
while the other does not necessarily do so.101 The decision nonetheless pro-
vides a new avenue for member states to begin the expulsion process and jeop-
ardizes benefits afforded to refugees.102  These threatened benefits include pro-
tection from refoulement and maintenance of family unity.103 For Mr. T. and 
other refugees like him, the loss of a residence permit is a major blow to the 
safety and security that international, EU, and German law are designed to 
provide.104 
B. How Strong Are the ECJ’s Safeguards and Will They Last? 
While the court may have weakened protections designed to afford a cer-
tain level of geographic security to refugees, it simultaneously strengthened 
safeguards.105 These safeguards include the required case-by-case analysis and 
the demand that member states continue to provide benefits to refugees who 
have had their residence permit revoked.106 Unfortunately, due to the incon-
sistent approach taken by many member states regarding refugee issues, the 
question remains whether these rights will be further eroded over time.107 
With the case-by-case analysis requirement put in place, the ECJ made 
clear that an individual must perform a number of actions in support of a ter-
rorist organization to meet the “compelling reasons of national security or pub-
lic order” requirement.108 Data indicates that EU countries tighten standards 
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regarding refugee rights as the number of refugees and asylum seekers rises.109 
In combination with the recent pattern of prioritizing security over refugee 
rights, this suggests it is possible member states will impose a stricter interpre-
tation of the rule and consequently revoke more residence permits.110 Despite 
this threat, the court took the important step of protecting the benefits of refu-
gees who find themselves in the limbo of having their residence permit re-
voked.111 Nonetheless, given the fact that that protection from refoulement is 
one of the guaranteed benefits, refugees may reasonably fear that the other 
benefits they have traditionally enjoyed are in similar jeopardy.112 
CONCLUSION 
In H.T. v. Land Baden-Württemberg, the ECJ found that even though Arti-
cle 24(1) does not explicitly provide for the revocation of a residence permit, a 
member state can nonetheless revoke a refugee’s residence permit under the 
Council Directive. Doing so requires that a refugee’s acts engender a threat 
that justifies revocation of the permit. As the refugee crisis continues in Eu-
rope, this decision can be seen as another step taken by EU member states to 
weaken the rights of refugees in the face of mounting fear and criticism. The 
court did provide certain safeguards, including the continued obligation to pro-
vide benefits typically afforded to refugees and the implementation of stand-
ards that require something more than cursory support of a terrorist group. 
That being said, many of the benefits are dependent on the refugee’s presence 
in the country, and it remains to be seen how great a blow this decision will 
deal to refugee protections. 
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